

# CoSMed: A Confidentiality-Verified Social Media Platform

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# Introduction

- Security in web-based applications



theguardian

## Facebook data-leaking bug exposes 6 million users' data

Facebook has admitted that bug caused the phone numbers and email addresses of users to be shared unintentionally




- Goal: Information flow control
  - not just access control!

# Previous work

- Security framework: Bounded Deducibility Security (Kanav, Popescu, Lammich)
  - Highly expressive wrt. *what* information may be released and *when*
  - (Interactive) verification technique

- CoCon

- Verified confidentiality of
  - ▶ papers,
  - ▶ reviews,
  - ▶ reviewer names,
  - ▶ discussions



# CoSMed

- Prototype social media platform
- Focus on confidentiality
- Tailored for needs of a charity organization

CoSMed    Submit a Post    Users    Logout    thomas

Home



School project



Tools



# Submit a Post

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**Title:**

**Text:**

**Visibility:**

 Public Friend

**Image:**

## My Friends


User ID	Name	Action
<a href="#">armando</a>		<button>Remove</button>
<a href="#">franco</a>		<button>Remove</button>

## Users

User ID	Name	Friend request
<a href="#">franco</a>		<b>Friend.</b>
<a href="#">andrei</a>		<input type="text" value="I would like to become your friend"/> <button>Send</button>
<a href="#">armando</a>		<b>Friend.</b>
<a href="#">demo</a>		<input type="text" value="I would like to become your friend"/> <button>Send</button>

# System Architecture

step : state  $\Rightarrow$  act  $\Rightarrow$  out  $\times$  state



# Security Requirements

- Confidentiality of
  - Friend-only posts
    - ▶ Text, image, and title updates
  - Friendship information
    - ▶ Who is friends with whom?





# Bounded Deducibility Security

- Generalization of Nondeducibility (Sutherland, '86):

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall t \in Sys, s \in List(Sec). \\ &\exists t' \in Sys. O(t') = O(t) \wedge S(t') = s \end{aligned}$$

where

- $Sys \subseteq List(Trans)$  is the set of possible execution traces of a system (i.e., sequences of system transitions)
- $O : List(Trans) \rightarrow List(Obs)$  maps traces to observations
- $S : List(Trans) \rightarrow List(Sec)$  maps traces to secrets

# Bounded Deducibility Security

- Adding declassification:


$$\forall t \in Sys, s \in List(Sec). (\mathbf{S}(t), s) \in \mathbf{B} \wedge \neg \mathbf{T}(t) \\ \rightarrow (\exists t' \in Sys. O(t') = O(t) \wedge S(t') = s)$$

where

- $\mathbf{B} \subseteq List(Sec) \times List(Sec)$ : **declassification bound**
  - ▶ Specifies which secrets have to be indistinguishable from which other secrets
- $\mathbf{T}$ : **declassification trigger**
  - ▶ If  $\mathbf{T}$  is true, secret information is allowed to be declassified

# Post Confidentiality


- Observations:
  - Actions (and outputs) performed by arbitrary but fixed set of users
- Secrets
  - Content updates of arbitrary but fixed post  $p$



# Post Confidentiality

- Declassification bound:
  - All secrets indistinguishable
- Declassification trigger:
  - Observer and post owner become friends or post becomes public


Too weak! What about  
“unfriending”?



# Post Confidentiality

- Distinguish two phases
- Mark transitions

Sec = Post\_Content  
+ {Open, Close}



# Dynamic Declassification

Declassification bound for the closed phase:

$$BC(ul, ul')$$

# Dynamic Declassification

... declassification bound for the open phase:

$$BC(ul, ul')$$

$$BO(ul, ul)$$

# Dynamic Declassification

... iterated via mutual induction:

$$B = BC$$

$$BC(ul, ul')$$

$$BO(ul, ul)$$

$$\frac{\text{last } ul = \text{last } ul' \quad BO(sl, sl') \quad \dots}{BC(ul \cdot \text{Open} \cdot sl, ul' \cdot \text{Open} \cdot sl')}$$


$$\frac{BC(sl, sl')}{BO(ul \cdot \text{Close} \cdot sl, ul \cdot \text{Close} \cdot sl')}$$



# Verification

- Unwinding
  - Construct alternative trace incrementally
  - Strategy for when and how to:
    - ▶ match observable transitions in both traces
    - ▶ insert/delete secret transitions as required by bound
  - “Unwinding relation” between original and alternative states and remaining secrets
  - Proof of unwinding conditions

# Verification



# Conclusion

- CoSMed:
  - <https://cosmed.globalnoticeboard.com>
  - Social media platform tailored for charity organization
  - Verified dynamic confidentiality requirements
  - Lesson learned for BD Security: declassification bounds incorporating dynamic triggers
- Next step: CoSMedis
  - Extension of CoSMed to distributed system
  - Compositionality result for BD Security